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^i ■2-1 
NORTHERN INTERESTS 



AND 



SOUTHEM INDEPENDENCE: 



A PLEA FOR UNITED ACTION. 



BY ^ 



7^"^ 



' '"o CHARLES jfSTILLE. 



Les hommes agissent, mais Dieu les m6ne. — Bossuet. 



N U. ;o.A, _^. 

5- PHILADELPHIA: 
WILLIAM S. & ALFRED MARTIEN, 

606 CuKSTNUT Street. 
1863. 



^"^ 






TO THE READER. 

The writer of the foUoAving pages proposes to examine 
the probable effect of Southern Independence upon some 
of the vital material interests of the North. He trusts 
that this examination, Avhile it may illustrate the value of 
the Union, will also show the importance of united action 
among ourselves to secure its permanence. His earnest 
desire is to prove how intensely practical a thing Ameri- 
can nationality is, and he will not hesitate to condemn, 
with equal frankness, the extreme views of either party, 
when they seem to him to conflict with its developement. 

Philadelphia, February, 1863. 



Copy-right secured, according to Act of Congress. 



We have now reached a period in the progress of 
the war when the prospect before us, in one aspect 
at least, is clear and unmistakable. Many of us 
have been from the beginning groping our way 
through mists and darkness, uncertain where that 
way might lead us, and fondly hoping that the 
rising sunlight would dispel the dim phantom of 
ill-omen which had haunted our footsteps during 
our dreary journey. But alas! while that sunlight 
may have chased away the phantom, it has revealed 
in its place a monster of more " hideous mien," pro- 
claiming in open and defiant tones the deliberate 
purpose of our enemies to establish on our borders 
an independent, foreign, and necessarily hostile 
power. 

We confess that we have been long in coming to 
the belief that the southern people were in earnest 
in hoping to carry out a scheme so extraordinary. 
It seemed necessary to deny to them the possession 
of an ordinary share of good sense and common 



6 NORTHERN" INTERESTS AND 

foresight, to suppose that they could really expect 
to establish permanently such a government, or that 
they really believed that the people of the North 
could by any possible combinations ever be made 
to consent to it. This hesitation, which has been 
shared by many, has unquestionably served much to 
weaken the enthusiasm with which, otherwise, the 
war would have been constantly supported. But 
there can be room for doubt no longer. It would 
be waste of time to examine all the declarations of 
the rebels on this point, but from the course ma- 
lignity of the Richmond newspapers, to the vulgar 
mendacity of Mr. Davis's speech at Jackson, they 
all agree in this, — that the inflexible purpose of the 
leaders at the South is, to establish, if they can, a 
great independent slave power on this continent, 
and that to render such a power safe and strong, 
every State which has the bad taste or the bad 
policy to prohibit slavery within its borders, must 
on that account be denied any participation in such 
a government, and that any theory of reconstruction 
or reconciliation, based on constitutional guarantees, 
— even one which would secure the services of the 
whole population of the North as slaves, according 
to the E-ichmoncl newspapers — must be abandoned 
as hopeless. 

This, at any rate, has the merit of simplifying the 
inatter very much. Only consider how anxiously we 
have endeavoured to find out the grievances of the 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 7 

South which were so intolerable as to justify them, 
on any principle which has governed mankind at 
other times, in rushing into a revolution ; how many 
of us have tried every species of conciliation, and 
have promised guarantees for their future safety, if 
the people would only return to their duty; how 
some have gone even further, and presumed to offer 
up New England as a sacrifice to- appease this 
insatiable Moloch. But it has all been to no pur- 
pose. The South has turned a deaf ear to the 
charmer, " charm he never so wisely." The rebels 
have in turn been bullied, beaten, starved, and beg- 
gared by one party; and flattered, caressed, encou- 
raged, and tempted with fine promises by the other; 
but to each party they have held precisely the same 
language — that of stubborn, defiant insult. No; 
the insane pride of the slaveholder still cherishes 
the dream of that perfect civilization in which 
slavery is to be really the comer-stone of the 
repubUc, in which every power which can mould 
the form of government, and every theory which can 
guide and control its action, shall be due to the 
pure and unmixed influence of the slave system 
upon the man and the citizen. Their future asso- 
ciation with us would destroy this darling theory, 
not because we are anti-slavery in our opinions, but 
simply because nature and our position have unhap- 
pily forced us to be non-slaveholding. They glory, 
therefore, in being aliens and foreigners, and they 



8 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

present to us the most singular spectacle of a people 
saved from utter annihilation, simply because a large 
party in the country with which they are at war 
refuse to take them at their word. 

We cannot, we wish we could, refuse the evi- 
dence of our own senses in this matter. The 
question is no longer whether we shall restore the 
Union upon any terms, or by any possible theory 
of reconstruction, not even whether the war is car- 
ried on upon principles, and with certain indications 
of a policy which we may not all approve, but it 
seems to us that it is narrowed down to this, 
whether our own permanent peace and security do 
not require us to crush effectually a scheme, which 
would establish on our borders an independent 
sovereignty. 

Let us look fairly at the portentous significance 
of the project before us, and reflect upon the ine- 
vitable consequences to our own safety and peace 
if it should be successful. This is no mere senti- 
mental nor speculative matter. It has nothing to 
do with our pride in preserving the integrity of our 
national existence in the eyes of the world, nothing 
to do with any mere philanthropic feelings in regard 
to the condition of the slaves, but it addresses itself 
to our deepest instincts, to considerations connected 
with the value and safety of our property, with our 
love of peace, and with all our hopes of the future, 
as those hopes are bound up in the belief of our 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 9 

capacity for developing our natural resources. Every 
man in the free States who owns a dollar's worth of 
property, or who has the smallest belief in the value 
of free institutions, is as much interested in the set- 
tlement of this matter, as if it were proposed to place 
the territory, which the South now claims, under the 
absolute sovereignty of England, France, or Russia. 
There is no middle ground. It can no longer be 
disguised that the rebels have determined to estab- 
lish, if they can, two separate nations out of the 
common territory, and that no concessions we can 
make, no securities we can offer, nothing but the 
irresistible power of a victorious army can change 
their purpose. 

This is the issue we have to meet, plain and 
mimistakable, and it does really seem as if it had 
been forced upon us just at this crisis, by the direct 
interposition of Divine Providence, to recall that 
united and generous enthusiasm with which this 
contest was first entered upon, and to rouse into 
efficient action that deep, common, universal instinct 
of the American heart — its intense nationality, which 
has only been slumbering of late, because it feared 
misdirection. In the legitimate influence, of this 
sentiment is our sure ground of hope. Let us not 
forget th^t in all the angry discussions about the 
policy of the war, while the theory of one party may 
be called that of conciliation, and that of the other, 
coercion, the avowed object of both has been the 



10 NORTHERN" INTERESTS AND 

same — the restoration of the Union. The Demo- 
cratic party has hoped against hope, profoundly con- 
vinced of the inestimable A^alue of the Union, and 
fondly believing that a policy of concession would 
secure its restoration. This is observable in all its 
public acts, and even in the avowals of those who 
are supposed by many to entertain very extreme 
views on the subject of concession. These opinions 
are only the outgrowth of that common sentiment of 
American nationality, which is powerful with them 
in common with men of all parties. That this na- 
tion shall be one, no matter at what cost of pride 
or principle, is their inmost desire. No one con- 
spicuous in that party, so far as we know, with a 
single exception, to which we shall refer hereafter, 
has ever favoured the scheme of southern indepen- 
dence. On the contrary. Governor Seymour, Mr. 
Van Buren, or Mr. Charles Ingersoll, are quite as 
decided on this point as Mr. Lincoln himself Mr. 
Ingersoll, in a recent speech, remarkable not less 
for the sagacity with which he exposes the folly of 
this dream of southern independence — a theory, as 
he truly says, tenable only in connection with a 
perpetual war — than for the frankness with which 
he predicts the conseqnences, tells his southern 
friends, that if they have really made up their 
minds to persist in such a scheme, that the North, 
of all parties, must necessarily become a unit against 
them and their slave system, and that their ulti- 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 11 

mate ruin must then become inevitable. These are 
opinions which must sooner or later be forced upon 
thinking men of all parties, when they are con- 
vinced of the hopelessness of conciliating the South; 
and the alternative is presented, whether we are to 
protect our own nearest, home interests, by forcing 
these people to submit at any cost, or whether, on 
the other hand, we are to allow them to establish 
themselves in quiet and undisturbed possession of 
a powerful sovereignty on our borders. 

For let us reflect what this project of southern 
independence really means. To enumerate only 
some of the more obvious results, it includes, on the 
part of the North, the abandonment of Chesapeake 
Bay, with Fortress Monroe, its guardian at its outlet ; 
the possession, by our enemies, of all the forts on 
the southern coast, including those at Key West, 
the Tortugas, and Pensacola, by means of which the 
safety of the whole commerce of the North with the 
AVest Indies, South America, and California, would 
be jeopardized; it requires the secure protection of 
a frontier of more than fifteen hundred miles in 
length; it places the navigation of our great rivers, 
and especially that of the Mississippi^ under such 
control as might be arranged by treaty with a jealous 
foreign power ; and more than all, and perhaps worse 
than all, it takes away wholly the power of resisting 
the encroachments of European powers, who^ either 
in alliance with the South, or taking advantage of 



12 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

its hatred against us, would certainly not fail in any 
future war to attack us in that quarter which these 
proposed arrangements would render wholly defence- 
less. If the success of our enemies is to lead to 
such results, we may be pretty confident that when 
the matter is fully understood, there will be but one 
party at the North — the commonest instinct of self- 
preservation will make us a unit. 

Let us look, then, at this subject from a point of 
view whence it seems to us it has not been suf- 
ficiently considered. Let us turn our eyes away 
from the South, and forget for a moment that the 
war is waged to restore the Union, or to force rebels 
into submission. Let us look at home, at the North, 
and ask ourselves, what would be the consequences 
to us, to our peace, security, or prosperity, if we 
should falter in this great contest. Let us examine 
the four great pillars, which support the whole 
edifice of northern prosperity, so far as that pros- 
perity can be aff'ected by the action of a govern- 
ment — the free navigation of the rivers, — the secu- 
rity of our foreign commerce, — unrestricted inland 
communication and intercourse, — and safety against 
foreign invasion, and see how long they are likely 
to remain standing, if this dream of southern inde- 
pendence is realized. 

The very first idea which suggests itself to the 
mind in connection with the notion of an indepen- 
-dcnt sovereignty, is that fruitful source of the long- 



SOUTHERN" INDEPENDENCE. 13 

est and bloodiest wars on record in modern times, a 
long and exposed boundary line. We do not know 
that the project of independence is sufficiently deve- 
loped to enable us to say where the proposed bound- 
ary line is to run ; but be it a river or an imaginary 
line, it must be more than fifteen hundred miles 
long. If we follow the practice of European nations, 
a practice the result of necessity, we must, for our 
own safety, protect the whole of this line by for- 
tresses. Consider, too, the constant daily irritation 
arising along the whole of this frontier, owing to 
mutual jealousies, differing custom-house regula- 
tions, and more than all, from that prolific source 
of trouble, the existence of slavery on one side of 
the line, and its prohibition on the other. There is 
a strange theory that there is more likely to be 
mutual respect in the relations of inhabitants of 
independent nations, than in those of a people who 
are kept in unwilling subjection to the same rule. 
AYe are pointed to the hatred of the Irish to the 
English, of the Magyars to the Austrians, of the 
Italians to the Germans; but if we will recall 
the feelings of the Greeks to the Turks, of the 
Belgians to the Dutch, of the Portuguese to the 
Spaniards, or of the Swiss to the Austrians, we 
shall discover that the cause of this antipathy lies 
deeper than a dislike to a common government, and 
must be sought for in the far more radical differ- 
ences which arise from an irreconcilable hostility of 



14 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

race and religion. History, alas I lends no support 
to any such theory. It teaches, on the contrary, 
that "enmity between contending nations is impla- 
cable and venomous, just in the same degree as they 
have previously stood near each other, or as nature 
intended the relation of good will to exist between 
them. It is the secret of all civil and religious 
wars ; it is the secret of divided families ; it is the 
explanation of unrelenting hatred between those 
who were once bosom friends. Our position would 
be but the repetition of the Peloponnesian war, or 
of the German Thirty Years' war, with still greater 
bitterness between us, because it would be far more 
unnatural." Can we look calmly at these things, 
and not feel that a war of twenty years' duration, 
which would at last teach both parties that their 
only safety lay in Union, would be preferable to 
evils so intolerable'? Can we consent to owe our 
safety to a triple line of fortresses, like that which 
protects France from invasion on the side of Ger- 
many and Belgium"? or rather can we doubt that 
the North, with any such prospect before it, would 
become an "indissoluble unit," and strike down, at 
any cost, and with overwhelming force, those w^ho 
set up this monstrous pretension'? 

If it were possible that, from any motive, or from 
any possible combination of events in the future, 
we might yield to such a claim, we would not gain, 
by thus sacrificing our real interests and our honour, 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 15 

even that poor substitute — peace. If we look at 
the history of modern Europe, and seek for one 
word to define the character of the wars which have 
desolated the continent for the last century and a 
half, we may most properly call them wars for a 
frontier. All the passions which have driven men 
to war in the old world, find at last their expression 
in the desire to obtain a good frontier, a safe pro- 
tection against the ambition of their neighbours. 
What, for instance, was the object of the wars in 
which the Prince of Orange was engaged in the 
Low Countries, but to secure a barrier for his native 
country against the power of France 1 What were 
the campaigns of Marlborough but efforts to gain 
possession of the fortresses of Belgium, and thus 
protect the dominion of the Emperor of Germany 
in that country against the ambition of the same 
power? What was Frederick the Great's seizure 
of Silesia, but a desire to render the frontier of 
Prussia safe against Austria and Russia'? What, in 
more modern times, was the grand object of the 
early wars of the French Pevolution, but to obtain 
what they call their natural frontiers, the Hhine, the 
Alps, and the Pyrenees'? What cost Napoleon his 
first abdication, but his obstinate refusal to give up 
this very boundary 1 What, in our own day, has 
lost Lombardy to* Austria, but her persistence in 
interfering in the Italian Duchies, with a view of 
rendering her frontier safe against Sardinia'? and 



16 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

what has been the result of the war which grew out 
of these pretensions, but to make the French dream 
of a frontier of the maritime Alps a reality'? In 
the old and settled monarchies of Europe, if one 
thing could be supposed to be permanently estab- 
lished, after so many ages of strife, it might be sup- 
posed that that one thing was the boundaries of the 
respective states. Yet, notwithstanding all the 
wars, and all the treaty stipulations by which diplo- 
matists have fondly believed that these disputes 
had been finally adjusted, these boundaries become 
as shifting as the sand, when the whirlwind of 
human passion bursts forth, and the sword is made 
the arbiter of the destiny of nations. The fortresses 
which line every frontier on the continent of Europe 
are among the most suggestive objects which the 
thoughtful student meets with on his travels. 
While they tell of religion menaced, of indepen- 
dence preserved, of ambition curbed, they are also 
enduring monuments of a truth which lies deep in 
human history, — that no nation has ever been will- 
ing to trust its safety to the influence of those sen- 
timents of good will and mutual respect which are 
supposed to arise from free commercial intercourse 
and identity of material interests, but has felt secure 
only when girded about with the strongest physical 
barriers against the violence of human passions. 

If then, a boundary line could be agreed upon in 
this country, it does not seem practicable to adopt 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. IT 

the European plan of maintaining it, and it would 
thus be at the mercy of every outbreak of the bor- 
dering population. Even if this was escaped, ques- 
tions connected with it would be constantly arising, 
and it needs no prophet to predict, that they would 
be seized upon by any party, or by any ambitious 
general of ability, (and it is to be supposed that at 
some future day the American soil may produce such 
a personage, although certainly it has been uncom- 
monly niggardly hitherto in this respect,) as pretexts 
to involve the two countries in a general war. There 
is a vast deal of practical good sense at the bottom 
of the theory of American nationality, — the instinct- 
ive feeling that this country must be one. Its first 
introduction into American politics was under the 
auspices of a very wise and eminently practical man, 
to whose counsels American independence owes per- 
haps as much as to those of any other one man — 
Dr. Franklin. It is not generally known, but it is a 
fact now well vouched for, that at the first meet- 
ing of the Commissioners in Paris, to settle upon 
the terms of the Treaty of 1783, Dr. Franklin 
proposed that England should cede the whole of 
Canada to the United States, with a view, as he 
stated, of preventing the possibility of any future 
disputes between rival powers on this continent. 
His anxiety to secure an early peace, and the great 
victory of Rodney over the Count de Grasse, by 
which the French fleet in the "West Indies was 



18 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

destroyed, occurring just at this time, probably 
deterred him from further urging this project, 
which had been a favourite one with him at least 
as early as the year 1778. What would have been 
our position now, had this grand idea been then 
carried into execution'? 

Another problem closely connected with the 
question of boundaries, and, perhaps, even more dif- 
ficult of practical solution on the theory of south- 
ern independence, is the enjoyment of the navi- 
gation of the great rivers, which, rising in the 
free States, run so long a portion of their course 
in the southern territory. It is hardly necessary 
to say a word upon the inestimable value of these 
great channels of communication to the prosperity 
of the ten millions of freemen, who are now asked 
to hold so dear a right at the sufferance of those 
for whose use, in common with themselves, that 
right was originally secured. AYe may refer to it 
merely to remind the reader that the free naviga- 
tion of the Mississippi river to its mouth, has been 
necessarily from the beginning the central idea of 
all western progress, as the river itself has been the 
main artery along which has flowed hitherto the rich 
stream of its happy and prosperous life. Its indis- 
pensable value to all western developement was 
seen at the earliest period of the history of the gov- 
ernment, and strenuous efforts were made to secure 
as free a navigation of the river as was consistent 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 19 

with the possession of the territory through which it 
flowed, by the Crown of Spain. By a treaty made 
in 1795, a precarious right of navigation and deposit 
at New Orleans was obtained, and this was consi- 
dered at the time as a most important advantage 
gained for the interests of the West. Happily for 
us, France, who had succeeded to the Spanish do- 
minion of the couutry, from a jealous fear lest Eng- 
land might wrest this immense territory from her, 
thought fit to sell the magnificent prize to us, and 
Mr. Jefferson, with far-seeing sagacity, eagerly seized 
the opportunity of acquiring it ; thus, as Mr. Everett 
expresses it, " violating the Constitution, but found- 
ing an empire." 

From that day to this, the value of this acquisition 
has become more and more real and apparent. Into 
that magnificent domain, tempted by the boundless 
prospect of success of which the free navigation of 
the rivers was the surest guaranty, the ceaseless tide 
of emigration has poured, bringing with it the vary- 
ing forms of modern civilization, and a people has 
grown up, enterprising, active, intelligent, perse- 
vering, blessed with marvellous prosperity, and 
happy in the enjoyment of all the arts of peace. 
The people of the East have watched the progress 
of their western brethren with a wonder and admi- 
ration which has been shared by all the world, and 
have looked forward with complacency to the period 
when these great and prosperous communities, the 



20 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

free States of the Valley of the Mississippi, deve- 
loping to the fullest extent all the wonderful re- 
sources of their position, should become the centre 
and stronghold of our characteristic American civil- 
ization. Can any one suppose that this powerful 
race, with such a career before them, can tamely 
submit to the abandonment of this glorious heri- 
tage, or can consent to hold, at the pleasure of a 
foreign power, that unrestricted commercial inter- 
course, which has been the foundation of all its 
past prosperity, as it is the basis of all its hopes 
for the future. Certainly, to state such a proposi- 
tion is to demonstrate its absurdity. 

The force of these truths is so apparent that it 
has penetrated even the minds of those, who, in 
their revolutionary fury, seem to have forgotten the 
elementary distinctions between right and wrong, 
and the rebel Congress, we are told, has declared 
that the navigation of the Mississippi shall be free. 
In other words, it is proposed, when southern inde- 
pendence is recognised, to substitute for the free, 
common, unrestricted use of the great river, as 
now guaranteed by the -Constitution of the United 
States, a treaty with a foreign power, by which the 
country shall be equally well secured in its enjoy- 
ment. Now, in the first place we may ask, in view of 
the permanent security of the right, where is there 
any guaranty that a treaty will be regarded as more 
binding than the provisions of the Constitution 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 21 

itself which, in one sense, is the most solemn of 
all treaties? What does the proposition amomit to, 
when stripped of the false importance which some 
persons, who certainly do not get their ideas from 
history, attach to the notion of a treaty? Simply 
this, that the country is to hold this great outlet 
for her productions at the mercy of a foreign power, 
and that that power thus holding the very keys of 
her treasury, may starve her into compliance with 
any claim it may deem proper to make. But it is 
said, mutual interest and the laws of trade will 
settle this matter, the obvious material interests of 
both countries requiring unrestricted commercial 
intercourse. All this was eminently true when the 
jealousies and rivalries of different States in regard 
to the use of the river, had a common umpire in 
the Federal Government. But alas! this fearful 
rebellion has shown that when human passions are 
roused, material interests, like moral laws, are alike 
unheeded. 

Could we afford to trust this precious jewel in 
the keeping of the weakest and most pacific foreign 
power in existence? Its possession would infallibly 
give to any power the control of the destinies of the 
continent, and what would it be in the hands of 
that brave and turbulent race, whom Mr. Russell 
(the correspondent of the Times) describes as pos- 
sessing, — ^not the wisdom of the serpent, combined 



22 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

with the harmlessness of the dove, but "the sim- 
plicity of children, with the ferocity of tigers." 

The first essential to all successful commerce, is 
a sense of security arising from the consciousness 
of adequate protection in case of need. But what 
safety could there be to commerce when any line 
of policy which we might adopt, should be judged 
by such a population to be hostile? And how long 
would the voice of justice or moderation be heeded, 
when a foreign power had at command so formid- 
able an engine for our destruction 1 No doubt, in 
the event of a separation, a treaty might be framed 
by which the erection of forts on the banks of the 
river might be prohibited ; but, of course, such a 
stipulation would become inoperative the moment 
war was declared, although that is the only period 
when any such arrangement would be of the slight- 
est importance to us. 

There is another consideration, showing how 
impossible it would be to secure the free navigation 
of the great rivers, on the theory of southern inde- 
pendence; and that is, that in such an event, it is 
manifest that the political necessity for the control 
of the rivers to the very existence of the proposed 
government, would outweigh any question of their 
mere commercial value, great as it unquestionably is. 
It is not worth while to argue this point, for it 
must be clear that no government at the South could 
surrender, or consent to weaken, in any way, so for- 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 23 

midable a means of controlling the action of a power- 
ful neighbour. It would thus appear that the only 
alternative in this matter lies between the total 
abandonment of any real and substantial control 
over it, and a determination that the right shall be 
secured, as it now is, by the provisions of the Con- 
stitution. Would it not be better, in view of these 
things, that we should fight the matter out now, and 
settle for ever, who are to be the slaves, and who 
the masters, if that is the only practical alternative'? 
We cannot help feeling that when our people fully 
consider the proposition to confide the control of 
the Mississippi river to a foreign power, a project 
now veiled under the thin and transparent pretext 
of a guaranty of its free navigation, they are as 
likely to assent to it, as to return to the practice 
of paying a tribute to the Dey of Algiers for protec- 
tion against his own piratical corsairs. 

There is a good deal of misapprehension in some 
minds as to the peculiar sanctity of provisions in 
public treaties in regard to the free navigation of 
rivers. It is supposed that there is something 
exceptional in their character, which gives them a 
more permanent existence than the other stipula- 
tions of a treaty. This is so far from being true, 
that the principles which now govern this matter 
were introduced into the public law of Europe as 
late as the year 1814, when the doctrine of the 
right of the free navigation of the great rivers in 



24 NORTHERN" INTERESTS AND 

Europe, in time of peace, was first recognised by the 
Congress of Vienna. It is true that this is the 
only addition to the law of nations, among the many 
which were made by that great assemblage of Euro- 
pean diplomatists which has survived to our own 
day; but the reason is, that no general war has 
arisen on the continent between powers mutually 
interested in the subject, (except, perhaps, the dis- 
pute about the mouths of the Danube, which was 
one of the causes of the Crimean war,) so as to bring 
the matter again into discussion. But we may be 
sure that while Ehrenbreitstein and Cologne com- 
mand the Ehine, Antwerp the Scheldt, Mantua the 
Po, Magdeburg the Elbe, and the fortifications of 
Lintz the Danube, a war between parties mutually 
interested in the navigation of these great rivers 
would not terminate without giving decided advan- 
tage to that nation whose power, resulting from the 
strength and position of its fortifications, could con- 
trol their course. We must not forget that the 
practical question with us is, not how the right of 
navigation is to be secured during a time of peace, 
for then, as with the air we breathe, it is of interest 
to no one to interfere with its enjoyment; but how 
far, in time of war, its control might embarrass our 
operations, or force us into humiliating concessions. 
The question was settled by the Congress of Vienna, 
as a matter of general European concern, and the 
arrangement was guaranteed by all the powers. 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 25 

This is precisely the position in which the govern- 
ment of the United States stands in regard to the 
Mississippi and all our great navigable rivers, so far 
as the right of every citizen of any State to use 
them as channels of trade, is concerned. It has 
neither power nor temptation to grant peculiar 
privileges to any section, and is only desirous of 
developing, to the fullest extent, their great value 
for the convenience of all. This is the only sub- 
stantial guaranty we can ever have for the perma- 
nent enjoyment of these great arteries of civilization, 
and the proposition of a would-be foreign power to 
allow us to use our own, as its interests or passions 
may dictate, is a miserable mockery and insult. 

If we wish to know what the great West would 
think of such a scheme, let us listen to its true 
voice, as it comes to us in the trumpet tones of 
noble Rosecrans, rousing the very depths of the 
soul. "We know that such a blessing as peace is 
not possible while the unjust and arbitrary power 
of the rebel leaders confronts and threatens us. 
Crafty as the fox, cruel as the tiger, they cried 'no 
coercion,' while preparing to strike us. Bully like, 
they proposed to fight us, because they said they 
were able to whip five to one; and now, when 
driven back, they whine out 'no invasion,' and pro- 
mise us of the West permission to navigate the Mis- 
sissippi, if we will be 'good boys,' and do as they 
bid us. Whenever they have the power, they drive 



26 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

before them into the ranks, the southern people, and 
they would also drive us. Trust them not. Were 
they able, they would invade and destroy us without 
mercy. Absolutely assured of these things, I am 
amazed that any one could think of 'peace on any 
terms.' He who entertains the sentiment is iit 
only to be a slave; he who utters it at this time, 
is, moreover, a traitor to his country, who deserves 
the scorn and contempt of all honourable men." 

The whole theory of the binding force of treaties, 
which it is proposed to substitute for the control of 
the Constitution over the varying interests of the 
country, and the notion which prevails with some, 
that peace and security are the better maintained by 
treaty provisions than in any other way, seem to 
us very singular, very great delusions. Tliey cer- 
tainly find no support in history. We have only to 
study the map of Europe for the last century and a 
half, to discover that general treaties of peace, so far 
from being any expression of the real interests of the 
inhabitants of contending nations, represent only 
the concessions on one side, rendered necessary 
by the irresistible argument of victory on the other; 
and that, even in cases where mutual exhaustion 
would have seemed to counsel mutual concessions, 
the slightest military advantage, like the sword of 
Brennus, has been sure to incline the scale. Trea- 
ties based on such principles, where the force of the 
moment, and not the eternal laws of justice and 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 27 

equity, determine, cannot, in the nature of things, 
last longer than the pressure of that force remains. 

How many times has the map of Europe been 
wholly remodelled since the beginning of the last 
century, as the result of wars, arising from alleged 
violations of the most solemn treaties, whose pro- 
visions had been guaranteed by all the powers. It 
is a lamentable fact, that neither prince nor people 
has ever been restrained, (when either has had the 
power,) by any provisions of treaties of the most 
formal kind, from dealing with their neighbours in 
any way which their interests, or ambition, or love 
of conquest might prompt. The glory of our own 
system has been, that these disputes, which are 
inevitable between populations of differing interests, 
and which, in other countries, have been made the 
constant pretext for war, have here been submitted 
to the jurisdiction of the General Government, 
under the provisions of the Constitution; and if that 
Constitution is destined now to perish, stricken 
down by parricidal hands, the fact that for seventy 
years it kept the peace between rival and jealous 
sovereignties, if it did nothing else for the general 
progress of humanity, will always render it the most 
remarkable plan of government in human history. 
Let us reflect a moment upon what we have 
escaped in this country, merely of the evils of war, 
by being bound together by a Constitution, and not 
by treaties. Let us look abroad, at the fearful 



28 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

experience of Europe under a system which it is 
proposed we shall now adopt, and be thankful for 
the past, and wise for the future. 

No sooner was the treaty of Utrecht signed in 
1713, by which all the advantages which had been 
gained by England, in the campaigns of Marl- 
borough, were given up by Bolingbroke, who, as 
the event proved, while Minister of Queen Anne, 
was also the agent of the Pretender and friend of 
Louis XIV., than intrigues began in various courts 
of Europe to set aside its provisions. Spain, under 
the guidance of that most remarkable man. Cardinal 
Alberoni, although the recognition of Philip as her 
sovereign was almost the only condition of the 
treaty likely to remain permanent, became dis- 
satisfied with her abandonment of her Italian pos- 
sessions, and declared war against the house of 
Austria, to recover them. This, of course, at once 
set Europe in a blaze, which was not extinguished 
until the overwhelming force of the Quadruple 
Alliance enabled it once more to carve up the 
continent at the pleasure of its members. Pure 
exhaustion kept the nations quiet, until Frederick 
the Great, ambitious to enlarge his territory, not 
having the fear of treaties before his eyes, and 
thinking that he had only three women, Catherine 
of Russia, Maria Theresa, and Madame de Pompa- 
dour, to oppose his schemes of conquest, plunged 
Europe into a war which lasted more than seven 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 29 

years, and certainly destroyed the lives of more 
than a million of men. The result of it all was 
that Silesia became a Prussian instead of an Aus- 
trian province. So with the famous treaty of Paris 
in 1763, after another long war, in which the real 
object was doubtless, on the part of England, wholly 
to destroy the maritime power of France, new 
arrangements were made in regard to the territorial 
possessions of the different powers, not only in 
Europe, but on this continent, wholly inconsistent 
both with the provisions of the treaty of Utrecht 
and of that of Aix-la-Chapelle. Passing by the 
revolutionary era, and coming down to the period 
when legitimacy reigned triumphant, when the 
earnest desire, and obvious interest of the various 
nations combined to force upon them all the neces- 
sity of devising some plan of remodelling Europe, 
which would be permanently secure against the 
encroachments of dynastic ambition or revolutionary 
passions, what, we may ask, has become of the 
laborious work of the Congress of Vienna, although 
the arrangements then made, with a view of secur- 
ing a permanent peace, were mutually guaranteed 
by all the powers, great and smalU Greece torn 
from Turkey, Belgium from Holland, Lombardy 
from Austria, and the rest of Italy quietly taken 
from its recognised princes, and handed over to the 
house of Sardinia; the family of Napoleon, with 
whom the Congress had declared it would never 



30 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

treat, and to exclude whom from the throne of 
France at any future time, had been the anxious 
desire of all who signed the treaty, now firmly rees- 
tablished in power — what are all these events, hap- 
pening within the last fifty years, but a complete 
commentary upon the folly and delusion of the belief, 
that any treaties between foreign powers will last a 
moment longer than any one of them may have the 
inclination and force to break them'? Let us think 
of these things. Let us be grateful, when we re- 
member that the Constitution alone has secured to 
us the blessings of peace in the past; and let us 
determine that peace shall be maintained in the 
future, as indeed it only can be, by enforcing a uni- 
versal recognition of its mild and beneficent sway. 

We have endeavoured to show the incompatibility 
of southern independence with any security to a pro- 
posed frontier, or with the enjoyment of the right of 
navigation of the great rivers. Let us look for a 
moment how our interests would be affected by the 
possession of the forts on the southern coast, particu- 
larly those at Key West, the Tortugas, and Pensa- 
cola. It is impossible to find language more em- 
phatic in the expression of an opinion as to the value 
of these forts, in a national point of view, than that 
employed by Mr. Maury, late a captain in the United 
States Navy. This man, with some pretensions to 
science, which he employed in a great measure to 
debauch public sentiment at the South, by inflaming 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE, 31 

it with golden dreams about the commerce of the 
Amazon and alliances with the great slave empire 
of Brazil, was ordered by the Secretary of War to 
present his views on the general subject of national 
defences. In an elaborate report, dated in August, 
1851, he says: "A maritime enemy seizing upon 
Key West and the Tortugas could land a few heavy 
guns from his ship, and make it difficult for us to 
dislodge him; so long as he held that position, so 
long would he control the commercial mouth of the 
great Mississippi Valley. In that position he would 
shut up in the Gulf whatever force inferior to his 
own we might have there. lie would prevent rein- 
forcements sent to relieve it from Boston, New York, 
and Norfolk, from entering the Gulf. Indeed, in a 
war with England, the Tortugas and Key West being 
in her possession, it might be more advisable, instead 
of sending from our Atlantic dock-yards a fleet to 
the Gulf, to send it over to the British Islands, and 
sound the Irish people as to throwing off their aUegi- 
ance.^^ It was, as is well known, to secure these 
important positions, commanding the entrance into 
the Gulf, and the commerce of the Gulf itself, that 
Florida was purchased from Spain. If such would 
be the condition of things during actual hostilities, 
how completely should our policy in time of peace 
be governed by considerations as to the safety of our 
foreign commerce with half the world, which these 
strongholds in the hands of an enemy might com- 



32 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

pletely destroy. There is no need of statistics here. 
The most unobservant is forced to ask, what is to 
become of the commerce of our great maritime cities, 
and of the thousand interests which are bound up 
with it, in such an event 1 Let us learn wisdom from 
the example of other nations in this matter. Eng- 
land, as is well known, at the termination of all the 
great wars in Europe, has steadily refused any terri- 
torial acquisitions on that continent, preferring the 
possession of certain strongholds in different quarters 
of the globe, which would enable her to maintain in 
every quarter her commercial supremacy, and thus 
effectually control the policy of the world where her 
own peculiar interests were likely to be affected. 
Gibraltar, Corfu, Malta, the Cape of Good Hope, 
Aden, Singapore, Hong-Kong, Jamaica, Bermuda, 
Halifax, what are these but a standing menace to 
other powers, that her commercial supremacy is to be 
maintained in all quarters, at all hazards'? It is 
barely conceivable that any government we might 
have at the North, under any future combination of 
events, would dare voluntarily to abandon these great 
safeguards of our commerce. To such a suggestion, 
the only answer could be that of Mr. Pitt to the 
Spanish negotiators of the treaty of 1763, who asked 
England to give up some trumpery claim about 
curing fish on the coast of Newfoundland, and were 
told that the minister would not dare to do it, even 
if the Spaniards were in possession of the Tower of 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 33 

London. These positions are of course just as im- 
portant to the South as they are to us, for without 
them the South could have no real independence. 
We hold them now, and while their possession, with 
that of so many other vital points, convinces every 
thoughtful man how much real progress we have 
made in the course which, if persisted in, must 
sooner or later bring our enemies to reason, we are 
not likely to forego the present or future advantage 
which their possession gives us. 

Our capacity for successful resistance, in case of a 
foreign invasion, is a subject closely linked with our 
material prosperity, and it would be vastly dimin- 
ished by the establishment of southern indepen- 
dence. All our arrangements for national defence 
have been made on the assumption of the perpetual 
Union of the country. To what a condition would 
we be reduced in our controversies with a foreign 
maritime power, should such a power be in posses- 
sion of the forts on the southern coast, and of 
Fortress Monroe in particular. We may rest assured 
that the very first step by which a foreign power 
would attempt to enforce its pretensions, in any 
future disputes with this country, would be an 
alliance with the South. Our disunion would then 
have produced its bitterest fruits, for we should have 
the sad spectacle of a family strife, in which any 
gain would fall into the hands of a stranger. The 
utter inability of the South to maintain herself as 



34 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

a maritime power, and her most probable enemy 
being one of the chief naval powers of the world, 
would necessarily force her in the end to throw 
herself into the arms of some European nation for 
protection and safety. It does not conflict with 
this theory, that the South may be strong enough to 
achieve her independence, because the efforts by 
which that independence is gained, if it is ever 
gained, must necessarily be exceptional, and cannot 
be repeated ; any government, even that of the 
Prince of darkness himself, being preferable, as a 
permanent system, to the rule which has existed 
there for the last two years. We, in Pennsylvania, 
have a very near interest in this matter. We can- 
not forget that on the two occasions in which our 
territory has been threatened with invasion by a 
foreign power, the enemy approached us through 
Chesapeake Bay. Those who have heedlessly 
thought, that for the sake of peace the South might 
be permitted to go, taking with it everything below 
a certain line, without injury to. us, would do well 
to remember the battle of Brandywine, the conse- 
quent occupation of Philadelphia, and the winter at 
Valley Forge — the darkest hour of the Revolution ; 
nor should they forget that other projected invasion 
which we escaped, because its force was stayed by 
the victories at North Point and Fort McHenry; 
and that both of these invasions were attempted 
because the Chesapeake was then, what it is pro- 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 35, 

posed to make it again, by our own act, an open 
highway for such an enterprise. 

We might thus go on enumerating a vast array of 
exchisively northern interests which would be inevi- 
tably stricken down by the establishment of southern 
independence. But they all cluster round the four 
main supports of our whole system, which we have 
examined, and we trust that enough has been said 
to make it apparent that any hope of a permanent 
peace, the security of our property, our capacity for 
developing our natural resources, and our ability to 
make ourselves strong at home and respected abroad, 
depend upon our united determination to crush for- 
ever any such project. These truths have long 
appeared so self-evident to us, that we have sought 
with no little curiosity to discover by what means 
any northern man proposed to reconcile the obvious 
conflict of the interests of every one of his own 
countrymen with this scheme of southern indepen- 
dence. We have never seen the propriety of recog- 
nising the South as a foreign power, so far as we can 
remember, advocated in print by a northern man, 
except in a recent production of Mr. William B. 
E-eed; and although Mr. lieed concerns himself very 
little with the peculiar interests of his own country- 
men, whom he seems to regard with a strange con- 
tempt, yet he does favour recognition as a certain 
mode of securing a desirable peace. There are many 
things in this pamphlet of which we cannot trust 
3 



36 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

ourselves to speak as we feel, and we refer to it now 
merely to show the unsatisfactory mode in which 
Mr. Reed disposes of the all-important questions of 
boundaries and the right of navigation.* In regard 
to the first, the only mode of settlement proposed, 
" the only conceivable mode," is to allow each State 
to settle the matter for itself Kentucky and Mary- 
land are to be permitted to secede without any 
reference to their constitutional relations to our- 
selves, supposing that political entity, called the 
United States, still to survive; or to the injury 
which their action might inflict upon our most 
obvious material interests, supposing their territory, 
in the event of a dissolution, essential to the safety 
and security of the North. So in regard to the 
other ; the navigation of the rivers is to be left with 
the "States concerned;" that is, a foreign country 
controlling their course and outlet, we are to be 
satisfied that in peace and war that control will 
always be exercised with the most exact and jealous 
regard to our rights and interests. If we do not 
assent to this peaceful mode of yielding up our most 
vital interests, then we are threatened with an 



* We differ from Mr. Reed in many things, but we cordially join him in 
his protest against dragging the private life and personal motives of our 
opponents into the arena of bitter party strife. Many, in these unhappy 
days, have reached conclusions directly opposite to those of Mr. Reed, 
through a path of duty beset with sore trials ; and their remembrance of 
the sacrifices they have made of life-long friendships, and even of tenderer 
ties, is too fresh to permit them to judge, with indiscriminate harshness, 
the motives of those who may not agree with them. 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 37 

aggressive war, to compel us to do so; a war the 
horror of which is to be aggravated by a fierce strife 
among ourselves, one party being supposed to be in 
arms for the purpose of purchasing the poor privi- 
lege of joining the Confederacy, into whose blessed 
fellowship we are now told we may not come even 
as slaves. AVhat is all this, but a most extraordinary 
and characteristic commentary upon the peaceful 
mode of settling the business'? Everything the 
South wants, as a matter of taste or of interest, must 
be yielded, or we must give it up at the sword's 
point; but we are to strike neither for the Constitu- 
tion, which is set at naught, nor for the preservation 
of those interests of which it is the only guaranty, 
when they are imperilled by the arrogant pretensions 
of the rebellion. Mr. Reed is certainly too accom- 
plished a student of history, not to know that such 
vital questions as those of boundaries, and the right 
of navigation, were never settled in this way. The 
appeal has been made to force, and force only can 
decide it, and that decision, when the people of the 
North are not misled and deluded by these vain 
promises of peace, cannot for a moment be doubted. 
Mr. Reed points us to Mr. Pitt's opposition to 
the war of the Revolution. It is certainly not a 
little amusing to find the man who had so intense 
a hatred of the claim of any nation to govern 
itself, as to arm the whole of Europe against 
France, and to carry on a war from the prompt- 



38 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

iiigs of that hatred, which no one now denies 
was "accursed, wicked, barbarous, cruel," and the 
rest, — it is singular, we say, to find such a man 
held up as the opponent of the American war, 
upon any principle which can find favour with us. 
The truth is, Mr. Pitt was seeking for ofiice in 
1781, and during the French Revolution he was 
wielding despotic power. In what striking contrast 
is this miserable shifting of political principle with 
the last grand scene of the public life of Mr. Pitt's 
illustrious father, the great Earl of Chatham! He 
had been the early friend of the colonists, and the 
earnest advocate of their claims, so long as the advo- 
cacy of those claims was consistent with the alle- 
giance which he owed his sovereign. He came to 
the House of Lords, for the last time, a dying man. 
"Yet never," says the historian, "was seen a figure 
of more dignity ; he appeared like a being of a supe- 
rior species." He took his hand from his crutch, 
and raised it, lifting his eyes towards heaven, and 
said: "I thank God that I have been enabled 
to come here this day. I am old and infirm, have 
one foot, — more than one foot — in the grave. I am 
risen from my bed, to stand up in the cause of my 
country." He gave the whole history of the Ameri- 
can war, detailing the measures to which he had 
objected, and the evil consequences which he had 
foretold. He then expressed his indignation at the 
idea, which he had heard had gone forth, of yield- 



SOUTHERN" INDEPENDENCE. 39 

ing up the sovereignty of America; he called for 
vigorous and prompt exertion; he rejoiced that he 
was still alive to lift np his voice against the first 
dismemberment of this ancient and most noble mon- 
archy. Well may the historian add: "Who does 
not feel that, were the choice before him, he would 
rather live that one triumphant hour of pain and 
suffering, than through the longest career of thriv- 
ing and successful selfishness."* 

The practical conclusions to which all the conside- 
rations we have urged, point, are, that the rebel theory 
of independence necessarily makes certain claims 
which are inconsistent not only with our security, but 
with our national existence, with the safety of our 
homes, and the enjoyment of our property, that these 
claims are practically exclusive in their character, and 
that as any compromise or arrangement, such as is 
provided by the Constitution, is wholly rejected by 
one party, and as we cannot depend upon the force 
of treaties permanently to guarantee a satisfactory 
settlement, nothing is left but an appeal to force, to 
decide who shall control the great elementary condi- 
tions of national life on this continent. The appeal 
being thus made, the nature and character of the 
settlement depend entirely upon the measure of the 
success of our arms. This, as we have shown by 

* Lord Chatham's example illustrates another matter : AVhile he man- 
fully supported a Tvar -which he had earnestly sought to prevent, he did 
not hesitate to denounce most bitterly one of the means used by the Min- 
isti'y to prosecute that war, namely, the employment of Indians as allies. 



40 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

historical examples, is the experience of all nations. 
It betrays a gross ignorance of human nature to 
suppose that sitting down quietly, and offering 
terms of peace, which are prompted by a desire for 
conciliation, will ever cause the South to yield her 
haughty pretensions to independence. All such 
overtures are looked upon as so many evidences of 
weakness, and as was to be expected, their authors 
have been treated with contempt and derision. The 
South is under no such delusion, as some of our good 
people here, as to a pacific settlement. They know 
they are striving to gain what is just as important to 
us, as it is to them, and in such a contest they know 
that the sword must be the only arbiter. If, then, 
these interests which we have discussed, are so essen- 
tial to the North, and if they cannot co-exist with 
southern independence, then we must fight it out 
until some hope of a reasonable settlement rises out 
of the fortunes of war. The result of the war in the 
end, if we remain united, is of course a foregone 
conclusion, and with the hope of preserving that 
unity of action which must result, sooner or later, in 
an irresistible power, we have endeavoured to show 
how the common interest of every northern man is 
bound up in the result. 

May we venture, in an earnest spirit of concilia- 
tion, to make a few suggestions to each of the great 
parties which now divide the country, and whose 
concord in this matter is so essential^. 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 41 

The position of the Democratic party at this crisis 
is one of great responsibility. So far as we can now 
judge, the practical solution of the matter is likely 
to fall into their hands, they probably holding the 
majority in the next Congress. While we have full 
confidence in their anxiety to preserve our nation- 
ality, our fear is, that in their desire for peace, they 
may be led into concessions which may weaken us, 
and not accomplish the object for which they seek. 
They should never forget, in all their measures, that 
already we hold positions in the southern territory 
which, with the blockade of their coasts, the posses- 
sion of the forts, and of the outlet of the Mississippi, 
must practically settle the matter in the end in our 
favour, even if we confine ourselves to maintaining 
these positions without advancing a sinofle step fur- 
ther. We keep what we take, at any rate, whereas 
the aggressive war policy of the South has been, so 
far, a miserable failure. Now, it is hardly to be 
supposed, that the Democratic party could go before 
the people of the North, and ask their consent to 
the abandonment of such advantages. They are not 
likely to forget, that in a very dark hour of the war 
of 1812, happily for them as supporters of that war, 
news came that England, who had expressed great 
anxiety for peace, proposed as the basis of a treaty, 
to prohibit us from fortifying our northern frontier, 
and from keeping a naval force on the great lakes, 
while a right of navigation of the Mississippi should 



42 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

be secured to her, and that these monstrous preten- 
sions, when they become known, united the whole 
people in favour of the further prosecution of a war, 
which had been quite as bitterly opposed as that in 
which we are now engaged. The time has not yet 
come for the application of the peaceful theories of 
settlement by which the Democratic party hope to 
heal our present troubles. Tliat time will assuredly 
come, if they are not too impatient; and if they 
show to the South an united front, teaching them by 
that sternest of all masters — the fate of war — to 
whose inexorable logic we must all in the end bow, 
that their choice is between safety within the pro- 
tection of the Constitution, and, at the best, the bar- 
ren sceptre of a worthless, because short-lived and 
merely nominal independence. 

With the same anxious desire for conciliation, 
and with equal frankness, we propose to make a few 
suggestions to the party now in power. Is it not 
manifest that our hopes for success in this war 
depend practically, not upon our waging it in such a 
way as to produce a conviction that its real object 
is to remove an evil, which, however great, is not 
likely to rouse any general enthusiasm at the North 
for its destruction, but rather upon our finding some 
policy, no matter what it is for the moment, upon 
which we can all be united 1 Was not this policy 
most unexpectedly revealed to us after the fall of 
Sumter, and did not the unity then happily estab- 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE, 43 

lished, receive the unanimous recognition of the 
present Congress in July 1861] Have we not 
become weaker just in proportion as we have wan- 
dered from the great, broad, catholic, policy then 
announced'? Whatever may be the effect of the 
policy of the proposed emancipation of the negroes 
upon the strength of the military resources of the 
South, and we do not believe that it will be favour- 
able to us, is not one thing certain, that at the 
North, this policy as a military measure, (and this is 
of course, the only ground upon which it can be 
justified,) has produced most disastrous results'? With 
a view to the restoration of the Union, have we any 
right to regard those in rebellion as aliens and 
foreigners, because they choose to call themselves 
such? While there is no instance in modern his- 
tory in which a formidable insurrection has been 
suppressed save by force, is there an instance in 
which the crushing power of military success has 
not been accompanied by the fullest promise of 
amnesty, a complete recognition of the rights, civil 
and religious, of the inhabitants, and a guaranty of 
the absolute security of the property of those who 
laid down their arms'? We venture to make these 
susrgestions because we feel that the real obstacles 
to the successful termination of this war are to be 
found, not so much in the means of defence pos- 
sessed by the rebels, as in the divisions which the 
adoption of these new and doubtful theories intro- 



44 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

duce among us. The only test of any measure, just 
now, it seems to us, should be, how will it affect our 
military operations'? and where any policy, however 
promising it may look as a theory, is new and 
untried, and must inevitably divide us, then it should 
be abandoned. 

There are many loyal but desponding people who, 
impatient of final results, forget to look at the pro- 
gress we have already made towards the attainment 
of our object. Our enemies understand this better 
than ourselves, and the Richmond Examiner only 
echoes the opinion of unprejudiced observers abroad, 
when it says that another such year of progress, and 
the Confederacy is doomed. "The Yankees keep 
all they take," — this is the true expression of our 
real strength, and their relative weakness. Look 
for a moment at the position of the South, as com- 
pared with that of France in the invasion of 1814. 
Her enemies were mighty in number, but their 
armies were made up of men who had been con- 
stantly defeated by the French in the battles of the 
previous twenty years. She was surrounded by sea 
and land, as the South is, but the invaders had not 
the advantages we possess, of holding, in the heart 
of the enemy's country, most important strategical 
points, and the great lines of communication; yet 
did any one hope that even the mighty genius of 
Napoleon, never more conspicuous than it was in 
that campaign, could save France from final defeat 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 45 

against such odds'? The result m the end, we can- 
not repeat it too often, is a simple question of 
endurance; although if we were to settle to-morrow 
with the South, on the basis of the uti possidetis — 
keeping only what we now hold — their independence 
as a nation would be a very unsubstantial shadow. 
Look once more at the English experience. From 
January 1807, to July 1809, eighteen months, Eng- 
lish expeditions of importance met with failures, 
more or less disastrous, at Constantinople, at E-osetta, 
at the Island of Capri, at Buenos Ayres, and at 
Walcheren. They lost the battle of Talavera, and 
Sir John Moore's army was driven out of Spain. 
The only successes gained by the English in Europe 
during these eighteen months, either military or 
naval, were the capture of Copenhagen, Lord Coch- 
rane's brilliant victory over the French fleet in 
Basque Roads, and two battles in Portugal. But the 
first of these events made Denmark and Russia open 
enemies to England, and Wellington's victories were 
rendered valueless by the subsequent retreat from 
Talavera.* 

* The -want of elasticity in the American character is certainly very 
remarkable. At one time, according to the newspapers, every movement 
■was a victory; and at another, when these "organs of public opinion" 
were in a diflferent mood, events which have proved really our most impor- 
tant successes, were looked upon either as indecisive battles or as failures. 
There are some people even now, who are not willing to believe that Antie- 
tam, which completely destroyed the unbounded hopes of the rebels in 
the success of an aggressive war, was a victory. We are obliged to learn 
from intercepted despatches, that the battle of Perryville, which at one 
blow delivered the whole of Kentucky, was a disaster to the South ; and 
■we find even the General-in-Chief telegraphing to Rosecrans that the 



46 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

There are some who fear that the disorganizing 
spirit which has manifested itself in certain parts of 
the country, may in the end penetrate to the army, 
and there produce disastrous results. AVe confess 
that we have too high an opinion of the intelligence 
of our soldiers, and too profound a conviction of the 
deliberate earnestness with which most of them have 
entered upon this contest, to entertain any such 
apprehensions. Brave men have an instinctive 
hatred of traitors and cowards, and are quite pre- 
pared both for the fire of the open enemy, and for 
that of the more insidious foe "in the rear." Our 
soldiers are fighting for an idea, — the sacred idea of 
country, and are not to be drawn aside from pressing 
onwards to the end, because some of the means 
adopted by the government may be distasteful to 
them. Certainly the most ungracious aspect which 
the disloyal opposition to the government presents, 
finding fault with everything that is done, because 
some great mistakes may have been made, is the 

rebel accounts confirm his own report of his victory. How differently 
they manage such things in France! Here is part of a song which was 
written and sung with "rapturous applause," in one of the darkest hours 
of her history. 

"Le coq Fran5ais est le coq de la gloire, 
Par le revers il n'est point abattu, 
II chante fort s'il gagne la victoire, 
Encor plus fort quand il est bien battu. 
Le coq rran9ais est le coq de la gloire 
Toujours chanter est sa grande vertu; 
Est il imprudent, est il sage, 
C'est ce qu'on ne pent definir, 
Mais qui ne pe.rd jamais courage, 
Se rend maitre de Vavenir." 



SOUTHERN" INDEPENDENCE. 47 

implied censure it casts upon our armies in the field. 
With singular unanimity, we have urged our noble 
defenders to rush to the rescue of the country in 
peril, and they have gone forth, men of all parties, 
and of every shade of opinion, to take our places in 
the great battle. They at least have "fought the 
good fight," with a single eye to the glory and 
honour of their country. It is impossible to honour 
these heroic men too highly, or to cherish them too 
tenderly. While there is a spark of patriotism or 
gratitude remaining in our national life, — while there 
is a sentiment of national glory or national honour 
left to preserve us from that political decay which 
our senseless discord must breed, — while there is a 
remembrance of the dauntless valour and noble self- 
sacrifice which characterise the army, — while there is 
a tender reverence for the memory of the martyrs 
who have fallen, we shall shrink from doing or 
saying anything which may weaken the faith of our 
soldiers in the holy cause in which they peril their 
lives. If the time ever comes when political passions 
shall so blind us, as to tempt us to obtain our ends 
by efibrts to demoralize our armies, God Almighty 
help us! for we shall then have richly deserved the 
fate which He has reserved for the nations visited iu 
His anger. 

There are some whose scruples it is impossible not 
to respect, who are lukewarm in the support of the 
war, because they think they see in certain acts of 
violence done to those principles of constitutional 



48 NORTHERN INTERESTS AND 

restraint which lie at the basis of our system, a ten- 
dency which, if carried out, would destroy our bar- 
riers against despotic power. To such men, the 
restoration of the Union, or the subjugation of the 
South, would be dearly purchased by the sacrifice of 
the safeguards of our own political rights. We 
think all such fears exaggerated, still it cannot be 
doubted that they exercise a pernicious influence. 
No one who has been brought up to revere the 
great principles of constitutional liberty can regard 
with favour what is called "military necessity," or 
raison d' etat^ still it is clear, that there are rare 
contingencies in which, like the law of self-preser- 
vation, it must be invoked and irregularly applied. 
No nation has ever gone to war without violating 
in some essential manner the well-settled rules 
which govern it in times of peace, and the dictator- 
ship of the Romans, and the suspension of the writ 
of habeas corpus^ are only different ways of recog- 
nising the same great necessity. One of the great evils 
of war, is that it requires for its prosecution such a 
concentration of power in the hands of the Executive 
that there is very great danger of abuse in its exer- 
cise. After all, however, we must never forget that 
in this unhappy condition of things our choice is 
reduced to a choice of evils. Shall we submit to a 
temporary despotism now, in order that we may be 
saved from one tenfold more fearful in the future \ 

It is satisfactory to find that history does not show 
any permanent ill effects upon the attachment of 



SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE. 49 

a people to free institutions, as the result of war. 
On the contrary, the activity and progress in every 
department which characterize the present gene- 
ration in Europe, can readily be traced to the 
effects, direct or remote, of the wars which grew 
out of the events of the French Hevolution. Yet, 
in England, good men and wise men, despaired 
not only of their country, but of the great cause 
of civilization and liberty. In that country, "in 
the early part of the war with revolutionary France, 
if a man was known to be a Reformer, he was 
constantly in danger of being arrested, and even 
the confidence of domestic life was violated; no 
opponent of the government was safe under his own 
roof against the tales of eavesdroppers and the gos- 
sip of servants; not only were the most strenuous 
attempts made to silence the press, but the book- 
sellers were so constantly prosecuted, that they did 
not dare to publish a work if its author was obnox- 
ious to the Court. Indeed, whoever opposed the 
government, was proclaimed an enemy to his coun- 
try. Every popular leader was in personal danger, 
and every popular assemblage was dispersed either by 
threats or by military execution." "And yet," adds 
Mr. Buckle, from whose work we have taken this 
gloomy picture, " such is the force of liberal opinions, 
when they have once taken root in the popular 
mind, that notwithstanding all this, it was found 
impossible to stifle them, or even to prevent their 



50 NORTHERN" INTERESTS, ETC. 

increase. In a few years that generation began to 
pass away, a better one succeeded in its place, and 
the system of tyranny fell to the ground. And thus 
it is that in all countries which are even tolerably 
free, every system must fall if it opposes the march 
of opinions, and gives shelter to maxims and institu- 
tions repugnant to the spirit of the age. In this 
sort of contest the ultimate result is never doubtful. 
The vigour of public opinion is not exposed to casu- 
alties; it is unaffected by the laws of mortality; it 
does not flourish to-day and decline to-morrow; and 
so far from depending upon the lives of individual 
men, it is governed by large general causes, which 
are in short periods scarcely seen, but on a compa- 
rison of long periods are found to outweigh all 
other considerations." 

Let us then, who have offered on the altar of our 
country, our treasure and the blood of our brethren, 
not hesitate even to make a temporary sacrifice of 
our constitutional rights, if the success of the great 
cause in which we are engaged renders so cruel a 
necessity apparent. For with success comes peace, 
not a peace which would prove a short-lived and 
deceptive truce, but a peace which would revive in 
all their former vigour the guarantees of personal 
rights, and which, even if it did not restore the 
Union as it was, would at least secure to us those 
conditions of safety which are as the very life- 
blood of our existence. 




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